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Author SHA1 Message Date
thepraandClaude Opus 5.5 1f3bb27e17 R3 two-factor sign-in: TOTP with recovery codes, asked for only after a correct password
Build / Build (push) Successful in 36s
Completion program R3 (docs/ROADMAP.md, 2026-10-17).

- Services/TwoFactor.cs: TOTP (RFC 6238, 30 s, 6 digits, SHA-1, one step of slack, Otp.NET 1.4.1) and ten recovery
  codes (SHA-256 kept, pulled when used). RootUser.Totp holds the secret, the last step taken (moved only by a
  conditional update, so a code works once even for two sign-ins at the same moment) and the codes' hashes.
- /clientapi/user/totp/setup (the password) answers the secret, its otpauth:// URI and a QR code as an SVG data URI
  (QRCoder 1.8.0); /totp/enable takes the app's first code, shows the recovery codes once and ends every other session
  (this device gets a new one); /totp/disable takes the password and a code. GET /clientapi/user/account says whether
  it is on and how many recovery codes are left.
- Sign-in (/clientapi/user/login, the invitation login, /oauth/login) asks for LoginForm.OneTimeCode with a 428, and
  only once the password was right; the OAuth page has the field. Recovery by email leaves two-factor on.
- PrivaPub admin reset-totp <root>: the way back for a login that lost its authenticator and its codes.
- scenarios/accounts.sh checks it all, with codes computed in Python; the OAuth page with its antiforgery token.

Verified: dotnet build PrivaPub.sln -c Release; the pasture (gts, mailpit): accounts 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpVCoDeM1qUTRp4fXQdfof
2026-10-17 03:18:19 +02:00
thepraandClaude Opus 5.5 cff75e3a47 R2 accounts are safe: email by password and code, recovery only to it, sessions that end
Build / Build (push) Successful in 26s
Completion program R2 (docs/ROADMAP.md, 2026-10-17).

- An email address is set only with the password and a 6-digit code sent to it: /clientapi/user/email, /email/verify,
  /email/remove and GET /clientapi/user/account (EmailVerification: an hour, five tries, the code's hash only;
  EmailVerificationJob through the new IMailer). The request answers one sentence whether or not the address is free,
  and nothing goes to an address another login verified. The old POST /clientapi/user/update, which changed the
  address with neither and said when one was taken, answers 422.
- Recovery writes only to a verified address; migration _019 keeps the addresses given before verification existed.
- A changed password ends every session and every persona token, and answers a new JWT for the device that changed it.
- Sessions: every JWT carries its session's id ("si", kept by sniff/again). GET /clientapi/user/logout, which did
  nothing, ends that session alone (RootUser.EndedSessions, until its tokens would expire); POST
  /clientapi/user/logout/everywhere ends them all.
- AppConfiguration:HashingOptions was never bound, so passwords were hashed at the default 9789 iterations: it is
  bound now, at 210,000, and a hash made at other iterations is made again at the next sign-in (matched on the old
  hash, so two sign-ins never undo each other).
- Recovery and verification codes expire through TTL indexes; EmailVerification is never in a backup.
- AppConfigurationService reads appsettings as they are now, not the copy older builds saved in Mongo on first boot.
- ViewUserSettings and RootUserSettings carry SavedAt, so a client signing in keeps its own theme until one saved.
- Pasture: peers/mailpit.sh (Mailpit 1.31.4 as mailpit.test) receives PrivaPub's mail; recovery links open
  https://decepub.test. scenarios/accounts.sh, in sweep batch A, checks all of the above (28 checks).

Verified: dotnet build PrivaPub.sln -c Release; the pasture with gts and mailpit: accounts 28/28 and gts, 91 passed,
0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpVCoDeM1qUTRp4fXQdfof
2026-10-17 03:13:16 +02:00